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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Newark police officers forcibly entered and searched 
the apartment of Adriano Roman’s girlfriend.  App. at 386, 
391, 459, 486.  They arrested Roman, who was present in the 
apartment, after they found drugs in a common area that was 
shared by multiple tenants.  Id. at 399, 479.  Though he was 
imprisoned for over six months and indicted for various drug 
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offenses, the New Jersey Superior Court found the search to 
be unlawful and the charges were dropped. 
Roman now brings claims against the City of Newark 
(which includes its Police Department) and various police 
officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (which gives a federal 
remedy against state officials who, acting under color of state 
law, deprive “any citizen of the United States . . . of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [U.S.] 
Constitution and laws”) and New Jersey tort law.  He alleges 
the City had a pattern or practice of constitutional violations 
and failed to train, supervise, and discipline its officers.  He 
also pleads an unlawful search claim against the officers and 
contends they are liable for false imprisonment and malicious 
prosecution.  The District Court dismissed all of the claims 
because they were inadequately pled.  It also held the City did 
not have an ongoing practice of unconstitutional searches and 
arrests. 
While most of Roman’s claims do not withstand 
dismissal, his § 1983 claims against the City do.  He has 
adequately alleged that its Police Department had a custom of 
warrantless searches and false arrests.  He also sufficiently 
pled that the Department failed to train, supervise, and 
discipline its officers, specifically with respect to “the 
requirements of [the] Fourth Amendment and related law.”  
App. at 160.  Because Roman has stated a plausible claim 
against the City, we vacate and remand the District Court’s 
holding on municipal liability.  We affirm in all other 
respects. 
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I. Background1  
On May 2, 2014, Roman and his girlfriend Tiffany 
Reyes were watching a movie in her apartment’s bedroom.  
App. at 386, 389, 395.  Unbeknownst to them, four Newark 
police officers had set up surveillance outside of her building 
because of complaints about narcotics activity.  Id. at 338.  
The officers heard an argument between a man and a woman, 
id. at 340-42, and decided to enter Reyes’ apartment without 
a warrant, id. at 491.   
After they stepped inside the building, they discovered 
that the front door of the apartment was locked.  They also 
                                              
1 As noted below, we must, while reviewing a ruling 
on a motion to dismiss, view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.  Accordingly, without judging the 
facts, we recount them as set out in the amended complaint 
and the transcript of the suppression hearing referred to 
below.  Although Roman did not attach the transcript to the 
amended complaint, the Defendants included it in their 
motion to dismiss and told the District Court it was “capable 
of judicial notice” and “integral to the [c]omplaint.”  App. at 
130.  Thus we consider it at this stage.     
 
In any event, both the amended complaint and 
transcript note that the officers forcibly entered the apartment, 
assaulted Roman, and falsely charged him with possession of 
a controlled substance.  See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 22, 28.  Any 
minor differences in the two documents do not affect our 
analysis of his municipal liability claim.  See infra Section 
III.A (explaining that the events leading up to Roman’s 
search and arrest are not relevant to the merits of his 
municipal liability claim).  
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noticed Melissa Isaksem, Reyes’ friend, walking inside the 
building.  Id. at 417-20.  They stopped and questioned her.  
Id. at 417, 419.  When she told them she was visiting Reyes, 
id. at 419, they ordered her to knock on the apartment door 
for them and threatened to arrest her if she did not comply, id. 
at 419-20.  Isaksem led them to the apartment and stood 
directly in front of the peephole.  Id. at 421.  The police stood 
to her left, presumably out of the peephole’s range.  Id.  An 
officer knocked on her behalf.  Id.  Reyes asked who was at 
the door, and Isaksem announced her presence.  Id. 
Reyes opened the door, expecting to see only Isaksem.  
Id. at 386, 400, 501.  Instead, several officers rushed inside.  
Id. at 387, 400, 501.  They handcuffed Roman, Reyes, and 
Isaksem, then demanded Roman “call someone to bring drugs 
to the [apartment].”  Am. Compl. ¶ 30 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  If he did, they assured him they would 
“‘make a deal’ and ‘let him go.’”  Id.  Roman refused the 
officers’ demands, id. ¶ 33, and the police searched the 
apartment.  Eventually they found drugs in a common-area 
space that was shared by multiple tenants and located in the 
back of the apartment.  App. at 399, 479.  After seizing the 
contraband, they yelled, “[W]e got you, motherfucker[;] . . . 
you’re fucked now.”  Id. at 427.  Officer Rodger Mendes 
walked back to Roman, “flipped him . . . on[]to his stomach 
. . . , put his knee in his neck[,] and . . . said he was going to 
get raped [in prison].”  Id. at 428.  Another officer informed 
Roman’s father, who lived next door and observed parts of 
the search, that his son “would go away for a long time.”  Id. 
at 454.   
Roman was arrested and imprisoned on the same night.  
The officers filed a criminal complaint against him for 
possession of, as well as intent to distribute, heroin and 
cocaine.  A New Jersey grand jury returned a six-count 
indictment against him for the same offenses.   
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In response, Roman moved to suppress the evidence 
seized from the apartment.  He argued the search was invalid 
under the Fourth Amendment because the contraband was not 
in plain view and thus a warrant was needed.  The New Jersey 
Superior Court agreed.  It concluded the plain-view exception 
did not apply and suppressed the contraband.   
The State of New Jersey did not appeal the ruling and 
instead moved to dismiss the case.  The Superior Court 
granted its motion in December 2014 and issued a final 
judgment of dismissal.  Roman was released from prison 
during the same month.   
Approximately a year later, Roman brought § 1983 
and state-law tort claims against the City of Newark and 
various police officers (for simplicity, the City and the 
officers are jointly referred to as the “Defendants”).  Among 
other things, he alleged the City had a custom or policy of 
unconstitutional searches, inadequate training, and poor 
supervision and discipline.2  He also claimed the officers 
unlawfully searched his apartment and were liable for the 
torts of unlawful imprisonment and malicious prosecution.3 
                                              
2 Roman’s amended complaint also included 
allegations of discrimination of national origin in violation of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985, conspiracy to commit an unlawful search in violation 
of the New Jersey Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 
conspiracy to commit unlawful imprisonment in violation of 
42 U.S.C. § 1985.  We do not address these claims, as Roman 
does not press them on appeal.  
 
3 We construe Roman’s claim for unlawful 
imprisonment as a claim for false imprisonment.  Although 
7 
 
The Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss.  
The District Court sided with them, dismissing the complaint 
in its entirety.  It first addressed Roman’s claim against the 
City and concluded the complaint “fail[ed] to plead . . . a 
custom or policy” of unlawful searches and a failure to train 
or supervise officers.  Roman v. City of Newark, Civil Action 
No. 16-1110-SDW-LDW, 2017 WL 436251, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 30, 2017).  Although the complaint alleged “a pattern or 
practice of constitutional violations in areas including stop[] 
and arrest practices, use of force, and theft by officers,” the 
Court did not consider that sufficient to state a claim.  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Compl. ¶ 59).  
Instead, it viewed those practices as predating Roman’s arrest 
and observed that “the imposition of a [f]ederal [m]onitor 
indicate[d] [the City’s] attempts to change any wrongful 
policies or practices.”  Id.   
The Court also held the unlawful search claim was 
inadequately pled, as Roman did not “explain which 
[Defendant(s)] committed the allegedly wrongful acts” during 
the search and arrest.  Id.  Turning to the false imprisonment 
and malicious prosecution claims, it construed them as state-
law claims and noted that plaintiffs must comply with the 
                                                                                                     
New Jersey lacks a cause of action for “unlawful 
imprisonment,” it has codified the elements of a false 
imprisonment claim.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:13-3; Mallery 
v. Erie R. Co., 92 A. 371, 371 (N.J. 1914) (“This appeal 
brings up a judgment recovered by the respondent in an 
action for false imprisonment.  The declaration described 
the unlawful imprisonment. . . .”); see also 8 American Law 
of Torts § 27:1 (“False imprisonment, sometimes called 
criminal restraint or unlawful imprisonment, is committed 
when a defendant so restrains another person as to interfere 
substantially with his liberty.”). 
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New Jersey Tort Claims Act before bringing them against 
public entities.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-1 et seq.  Because 
the “[c]omplaint nowhere allege[d]” Roman complied with 
the Act’s procedures, the Court dismissed those claims as 
well.  Roman, 2017 WL 436251, at *6.  
The Court’s dismissal was without prejudice, and it 
granted Roman leave to amend.  He did so by omitting his 
tort claims and retaining his other allegations in almost 
identical form.  The Court dismissed his amended complaint 
and reaffirmed its ruling on reconsideration.  This appeal 
followed.4  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
The District Court had federal-question and 
supplemental jurisdiction per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a), 
respectively, and we have jurisdiction over its final orders 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
We review de novo its dismissal of a complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  See Phillips v. 
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  
When conducting our review, “we accept all factual 
allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. 
Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  However, “we are not compelled 
to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted 
inferences . . . or a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation[.]”  Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d 
                                              
4 Roman passed away while this appeal was pending, 
and his estate brings the claims on his behalf.  We do not 
distinguish between Roman and his estate in this opinion. 
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Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal 
citation omitted).  
III. Discussion  
A.   Roman sufficiently pled a municipal liability 
claim against Newark.  
 As noted, Roman alleges the City is liable under 
§ 1983 because it “engaged in a pattern or practice of 
constitutional violations,” “failed to properly train and/or 
supervise” its police force, and “failed to properly and 
adequately control and discipline” its police officers.5  Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 68, 73-74.  Before discussing the merits of his 
claims, Roman directs our attention to the types of documents 
we may consider on a motion to dismiss.  He contends we 
may review three sources that were provided to the District 
Court: an article published in the Newark Star Ledger (the 
“Star Ledger article”), a press release issued by the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office (the “press release”), and a consent decree 
between the United States and the City of Newark (the 
“consent decree”).  The Star Ledger article and press release 
were referenced in the amended complaint, see id. ¶¶ 68-69 
(including hyperlinks to both), but the consent decree was 
attached to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, see App. at 
129.  Roman also asks us to look at one other document: the 
Department of Justice’s Report on the investigation of the 
Newark Police Department (the “DOJ Report”).  Although he 
                                              
5 Roman brings his municipal liability claims under 
§ 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 10:6-1 et seq.  Because the latter “is interpreted analogously 
to . . . § 1983,” we consider his New Jersey Civil Rights Act 
claims along with his § 1983 claim.  Coles v. Carlini, 162 F. 
Supp. 3d 380, 404 (D.N.J. 2015).   
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acknowledges the DOJ Report was never provided to the 
District Court, he now claims it is integral to the pleadings.   
 Though the Defendants dispute that we may consider 
the DOJ Report, they add that we also cannot consider the 
consent decree because “no relevant provisions of [it] . . . 
were ever cited . . . to the District Court” and it is 
inadmissible settlement material.  Defendants’ Br. at 42.  
They assert as well, without any citation to the record, that 
Roman may not rely on the decree because he asked the 
District Court to confine its analysis to the pleadings. 
 We disagree with the Defendants’ view of the consent 
decree.  Although we examine the “complaint, exhibits 
attached to the complaint, [and] matters of public record,” 
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010), we can 
also consider documents “that a defendant attaches as an 
exhibit to a motion to dismiss,” Pension Benefits Guar. Corp. 
v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 
1993), if they are “undisputedly authentic” and “the 
[plaintiff’s] claims are based [on them],” Mayer, 605 F.3d at 
230.  That holding extends to settlement material because 
plaintiffs “need not provide admissible proof at th[e] [motion-
to-dismiss] stage.”  In re OSG Sec. Litig., 12 F. Supp. 3d 619, 
622 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also In re MyFord Touch Consumer 
Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 936, 961 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (same).  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has been clear about the scope 
of our review, stating we “must consider the complaint in its 
entirety, as well as other sources [we] ordinarily examine 
when ruling on . . . motions to dismiss, in particular, 
documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and 
matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”  Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) 
(emphasis added).   
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Here, although the consent decree was not attached to 
Roman’s amended complaint, we are free to review its 
contents for three reasons.6  First, the Defendants attached the 
decree to their motion to dismiss and affirmed that it is 
“capable of judicial notice” as an indisputably authentic 
government document.  App. at 129.  Second, contrary to the 
dissent’s assertion, the Defendants themselves argued (and 
correctly) before the District Court that Roman’s claims were 
based on the consent decree.  Compare Dissenting Op. at 5 
(“What is crucial is whether Roman’s complaint was ‘based’ 
on the consent decree.”), with App. at 129 (filing from 
Defendants characterizing the consent decree as “integral to 
the Complaint”).  Third, the amended complaint cited, and the 
District Court discussed, the DOJ investigation and federal 
monitor that eventually led to the consent decree.  See 
Roman, 2017 WL 436251, at *4; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68-
71.  Thus it was especially important for the Court to have 
considered the decree as well, given that it provides essential 
context to Roman’s claims.  That it did not was an abuse of 
discretion. 
That said, we may not consider the DOJ Report at this 
stage because it was not provided to the District Court in the 
first instance by any party.  Nor is it apparent that the Court 
considered it sua sponte.  See United States ex rel. Wilkins v. 
                                              
6 Though the Defendants and our dissenting colleague 
do not challenge the Star Ledger article or the press release, 
we note that we consider them because they are referenced in 
the amended complaint.  See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322.  As 
Judge Jordan explains in his concurrence, however, Roman 
does not need either document or the suppression hearing 
transcript to state a municipal liability claim; the consent 
decree gives his allegations enough plausibility to survive 
dismissal.  
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United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“Though we do not doubt the authenticity of 
these documents, nevertheless we will not consider them 
because the parties did not present them to the District Court 
and we do not find any indication in the record that the Court 
considered them on its own initiative.”).  Hence it cannot 
carry any weight in our analysis.   
  Turning to the amended complaint, Roman claims the 
City is liable for his unlawful search because it “failed to train 
its officers in the use of search and seizure techniques, 
probable cause, and/or methods to properly obtain a search 
warrant.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 95.  He alleges the Newark Police 
Department “engaged in a pattern or practice of constitutional 
violations” and asserts the Department of Justice appointed a 
federal monitor to oversee the reforms to which the City 
consented.  Id. ¶ 68.  His allegations also touch on the City’s 
failure to “control and discipline” its police force, id. ¶ 74, 
and failure to “investigate . . . instances of . . . police 
misconduct,” id. ¶ 81.  He characterizes the City’s practices in 
these areas as “tantamount to a[n] [unconstitutional] custom 
and/or policy,” id. ¶ 82, thus indicating its “deliberate 
indifference to [its citizens’ constitutional] rights,” id. ¶ 83.    
 The Defendants respond that Roman has failed to 
allege a municipal liability claim, as no part of the Star 
Ledger article, press release, or consent decree references the 
types of constitutional violations pled in the amended 
complaint.  They also contend the City had no notice “of any 
pattern of constitutional violations with respect to forced 
entry and searches of homes.”  Defendants’ Br. at 50. 
 To plead a municipal liability claim, a plaintiff must 
allege that “a [local] government’s policy or custom . . . 
inflict[ed] the injury” in question.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).  “Policy is made when a 
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decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish 
municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official 
proclamation, policy, or edict.”  Andrews v. City of 
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Custom, on 
the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course 
of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized 
by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to 
constitute law.”  Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (Becker, J.); see also Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 
269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A custom . . . must have 
the force of law by virtue of the persistent practices of state 
[or municipal] officials.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 Although a policy or custom is necessary to plead a 
municipal claim, it is not sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss.  A plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom 
was the “proximate cause” of his injuries.  See Kneipp v. 
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996).  He may do so by 
demonstrating an “affirmative link” between the policy or 
custom and the particular constitutional violation he alleges.  
Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 850 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
This is done for a custom if Roman demonstrates that Newark 
had knowledge of “similar unlawful conduct in the past, . . . 
failed to take precautions against future violations, and that 
[its] failure, at least in part, led to [his] injury.”  Id. at 851.  
Despite these requirements, Roman does not need to identify 
a responsible decisionmaker in his pleadings.  See id. at 850.  
Nor is he required to prove that the custom had the City’s 
formal approval.  See Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 
1063, 1067 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 The pleading requirements are different for failure-to-
train claims because a plaintiff need not allege an 
unconstitutional policy.  See Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 
F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[I]n the absence of an 
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unconstitutional policy, a municipality’s failure to properly 
train its employees and officers can create an actionable 
violation . . . under § 1983.”).  Instead, he must demonstrate 
that a city’s failure to train its employees “reflects a deliberate 
or conscious choice.”  Brown, 269 F.3d at 215 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  For claims involving police 
officers, the Supreme Court has held that the failure to train 
“serve[s] as [a] basis for § 1983 liability only where [it] . . . 
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons 
with whom the police come into contact.”  City of Canton v. 
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (footnote omitted).  A 
plaintiff sufficiently pleads deliberate indifference by 
showing that “(1) municipal policymakers know that 
employees will confront a particular situation[,] (2) the 
situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees 
mishandling[,] and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will 
frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.”  Doe v. 
Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carter v. City of 
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
 In view of this case law, Roman has not pled a 
municipal policy, as his amended complaint fails to refer to 
“an official proclamation, policy, or [an] edict.”  Andrews, 
895 F.2d at 1480.  However, he has sufficiently alleged a 
custom of warrantless or nonconsensual searches.  He has 
also adequately pled that the City failed to train, supervise, 
and discipline its police officers.7 
                                              
7 We consider allegations of failure to train, supervise, 
and discipline together because they fall under the same 
species of municipal liability.  See Rosalie Berger Levinson, 
Who Will Supervise the Supervisors? Establishing Liability 
for Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline in a Post-
15 
 
 We start with Roman’s allegations on municipal 
custom.  He asserts the City had “a pattern or practice of 
constitutional violations in areas including . . . arrest 
practices.”  App. at 137.  He further contends it had notice of 
this practice, as it received “complaints against officers 
accused of . . . conducting improper searches and false 
arrests.”  Id. at 134.  The amended complaint, along with the 
press release and Star Ledger article, note that Newark was 
under the supervision of a federal monitor after Roman’s 
arrest.  Am. Compl. ¶ 68; App. at 133, 137.  According to the 
press release, the monitor would oversee reforms in several 
areas, including searches, arrests, and the intake and 
investigation of misconduct complaints.  App. at 137.     
 The consent decree echoes these points.  It covers the 
same type of conduct Roman alleges, as it “prohibit[s] 
officers from relying on information known to be materially 
false or incorrect to justify a warrantless search . . . [or to] 
effect[] an arrest.”  Id. at 158; see also id. at 163 (mandating 
officers to collect data on consent, the type of search, and “a 
brief description of the facts creating probable cause”).  The 
decree also requires the Police Department to investigate 
police misconduct, see generally id. at 184-92, with special 
emphasis on allegations of criminal misconduct, false arrest, 
planting evidence, and unlawful searches, see id. at 150, 186.   
 While the consent decree was not in place during 
Roman’s search and arrest, we may fairly infer that the 
problems that led to it were occurring during the time of his 
allegations and for some time before that.  See id. at 133-34 
(noting the investigation that resulted in the consent decree 
and federal supervision began in May 2011 and ended in July 
2014).  With this mind, the decree fortifies Roman’s 
                                                                                                     
Iqbal/Connick World, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 273, 280 
(2012).  
16 
 
allegations of unlawful custom because it acknowledges “a 
pattern or practice of conduct by the Newark Police 
[Department] that deprives individuals of rights, privileges, 
and immunities secured by the Constitution.”  Id. at 144.  
When viewed in conjunction with the Star Ledger article, it 
references the types of constitutional violations mentioned in 
the amended complaint: warrantless searches, id. at 134, and 
false arrests, id. at 158.  These violations were widespread 
and causally linked to Roman’s alleged injury, as the Police 
Department was aware of them but “rare[ly] . . . acted” on 
citizen complaints.  Id. at 134 (discussing complaints of 
“improper searches and false arrests”); see also Beck v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting the 
police department’s failure to act on complaints 
“perpetuate[d] the City’s custom of acquiescing in the 
excessive use of force by its police officers”).  In light of 
these allegations, “it is logical to assume that [the City’s] 
continued official tolerance of repeated misconduct 
facilitate[d] similar unlawful actions in the future,” including 
the search and arrest of Roman.  Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 851.  It 
follows that he has adequately pled a municipal custom and 
proximate causation under § 1983.    
 We reach the same conclusion with respect to 
Roman’s failure-to-train, failure-to-supervise, and failure-to-
discipline claims.  To start, the Star Ledger article includes a 
statement on police training from James Stewart, Jr., the head 
of Newark’s police union.  He conceded the “last training [he] 
received” was in 1995, when he first joined the Newark 
Police Department.  App. at 134 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Moreover, Stewart is not some unreliable, rogue 
officer—he is the head of the police union.  Nor is his 
experience isolated: the consent decree indicates Newark 
police officers in general were not trained on “the 
requirements of [the] Fourth Amendment and related law.”  
Id. at 160 (discussing various Fourth Amendment doctrines 
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that should be included in police training, including “the 
difference[] . . . between voluntary consent and mere 
acquiescence to police authority”).  The consent decree also 
touches on supervisory review of unlawful searches and 
arrests, requiring desk lieutenants and unit commanders to 
review “searches that appear to be without legal justification” 
and “arrests that are unsupported by probable cause.”  Id. at 
161.  Finally, it provides disciplinary measures for police 
officers who engage in “unlawful . . . searches” and “false 
arrests.”  Id. at 192.  At the pleadings stage, a fair inference is 
that the consent decree was necessary because of Department-
wide failures, not because one officer was last trained in 
1995. 
This is enough to prove municipal liability because the 
City “[knew] to a moral certainty” that its officers would need 
to conduct searches.  Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.  Yet in at 
least one instance it failed to provide training since 1995, see 
App. at 134, and per the decree its training did not cover the 
basics of the Fourth Amendment, see id. at 158-61.  The City 
also did not discipline officers for “sustained allegations of 
misconduct,” including “prior violations” and other 
“aggravating factors.”  Id. at 192-93.  In view of these 
deficiencies, one could reasonably infer that the City’s 
inaction “reflected [its] ‘deliberate indifference’” to Roman’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 
520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997); cf. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 
(“[C]ity policymakers know to a moral certainty that their 
police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons. . . .  
Thus, the need to train officers in the constitutional 
limitations on the use of deadly force . . . can be said to be ‘so 
obvious’ . . . that failure to do so could properly be 
characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional 
rights.” (internal citation omitted)).  One could also infer that 
the City’s failure to establish an adequate training program 
contributed to the specific constitutional violations alleged in 
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the amended complaint.  See Brown, 520 U.S. at 409-10 
(“The likelihood that the situation will recur and the 
predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle 
that situation will violate citizens’ rights . . . may also support 
an inference of causation.”); cf. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne 
Cty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 582 (3d Cir. 
2004) (reversing the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of a municipality because of “unrebutted 
testimony” that its juvenile detention center “did not have an 
adequate training program”).   
We conclude that the allegations regarding Newark’s 
failure to train, supervise, and discipline are strong enough to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-98.  
Among them are: a failure to train officers on obtaining a 
search warrant, id. ¶ 67, and on “issuing truthful investigative 
reports,” id. ¶ 77; a failure to supervise and manage officers, 
id. ¶¶ 67-68; and a failure to discipline officers, id. ¶ 74, first 
by “refus[ing]” to create a well-run Internal Affairs 
Department, id. ¶ 81, and second by “inadequately 
investigating, if investigating at all, citizens’ complaints 
regarding illegal search and seizure, id. ¶ 84.  The result was a 
“complete lack of accountability” and of “record keeping,” id. 
¶ 92, leading to a culture in which officers “knew there would 
be no professional consequences for their action[s],” id. ¶ 94.  
As the amended complaint alleges, it should come as no 
surprise that these conditions led to a federal investigation.  
See id. ¶ 89. 
The dissent’s attempt to distinguish the consent decree 
is unpersuasive.  First, it misperceives the decree as 
concerning only police interactions with “pedestrians or the 
occupants of vehicles,” not home searches.  Dissenting Op. at 
7 (“The consent decree says nothing about arrests and 
searches without consent that occur at residences . . .”).  In 
fact, one concern of the decree was false arrests, see App. at 
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158, which can occur both at home and on the street.  And the 
decree does concern home searches: it sets parameters 
officers must follow before searching “a home based upon 
consent.”  Id.  Although Reyes by no means consented to the 
search here, she willingly opened her apartment door only 
because the police had used her friend Isaksem as a Trojan 
horse to gain entry.   
Second, the dissent believes that the consent decree 
cannot help Roman’s case because Roman was Hispanic.  See 
Dissenting Op. at 7 (“[T]he decree addressed police practices 
that disparately impacted the black community.  But that 
racial disparity did not apply to Roman, who was Hispanic.”).  
To the contrary, the consent decree includes an entire section 
entitled “Bias-Free Policing,” see App. at 165-67, that never 
restricts itself to bias against the black community.  Instead, it 
provides that police officers must “operate without bias based 
on any demographic category,” id. at 166 (emphasis added), 
and specifically forbids officers from discriminating based on 
“proxies for demographic category” such as “language 
ability,” id. at 167.  Plainly, the consent decree was meant to 
protect all Newark residents, including Hispanic residents.  
Further, we find it difficult to square the dissent’s 
reasoning with the record evidence discussing the City’s 
troubling practices around the time of Roman’s search and 
arrest.  See, e.g., id. at 134 (stating only one complaint out of 
261 filed was sustained by department investigators); id. at 
158 (prohibiting officers from relying on materially false 
information to justify a warrantless search); id. at 160 
(requiring police officers to be trained on “the requirements 
of [the] Fourth Amendment and related law”); id. at 161 
(mandating supervisory review of “searches that appear to be 
without legal justification” and “arrests that are unsupported 
by probable cause”).   
20 
 
Unable to distinguish the consent decree outright, the 
dissent offers two narrow readings of the decree.  First, it 
maintains that the decree can speak only to the Police 
Department’s obligations going forward rather than shed any 
light whatsoever on the “status quo” within the Department 
before federal intervention.  See Dissenting Op. at 10 (stating 
that the decree does not provide “any detail as to the status 
quo it addressed”).  The dissent concedes that the DOJ 
probably did not enter into the consent decree because it was 
impressed with Newark’s policing practices and wanted to 
encourage the City to keep up the good work.  Id.  At this 
stage, we must draw not only such obvious inferences, but 
also all reasonable ones, in favor of Roman.  Thus we agree 
with the dissent on the “clear” difference between “agreeing 
to train more” (the consent decree on its face) and “agreeing 
that prior training was constitutionally inadequate” (the way 
in which the decree supports Roman’s claims).  Id.  We 
simply believe that a reasonable inference bridges the gap in 
this case.  Indeed, no inference is needed because Roman 
made the link explicit in the amended complaint.  See Am. 
Compl. ¶ 89 (stating that the Police Department’s “deliberate 
indifference to citizens’ rights is what led to the imposition of 
a [f]ederal [m]onitor program . . . .”). 
Second, the dissent believes that the consent decree’s 
training requirements, from which we can reasonably infer 
inadequate training before the decree, simply amount to 
“additional training” in, for instance, the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Dissenting Op. at 10.  To the contrary, 
the consent decree was meant to take the Newark Police 
Department back to basics:  Do not lie on a warrant 
application or to justify a warrantless search, App. at 158; 
investigate police activities that appear to have lacked legal 
justification, id. at 161; and at all times follow the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, id. at 160. 
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The theme of the dissent appears to be that we are 
refashioning the amended complaint.  It claims we are 
vacating the District Court’s decision based on facts and 
arguments that were not presented to it.  But as discussed 
above, we are engaged in de novo review of the adequacy of 
the amended complaint in light of documents that were before 
the District Court and that informed its allegations.  See supra 
pp. 8-10.  Additionally, and to repeat, the specific events 
leading up to Roman’s search and arrest are not relevant to 
the merits of his municipal liability claim.  Thus we are not 
vacating the Court’s decision for excluding these facts from 
its analysis.  
  Rather, our focus is directed to Newark’s practice at 
the time of Roman’s search and arrest.  The Court had notice 
of them, as it acknowledged that Roman alleged “a ‘pattern or 
practice of constitutional violations in areas including stop[] 
and arrest practices, use of force, and theft by officers.’”  
Roman, 2017 WL 436251, at *4 (quoting Compl. ¶ 59).  
Nonetheless it dismissed the complaint and amended 
complaint because it viewed the City as attempting to change 
its practices.  Even if the record can be read that way—and 
we doubt that8—the District Court’s rationale has the wrong 
                                              
8 The record does not support the Court’s inferences, 
as it tells us the DOJ’s investigation was not completed until 
July 2014, see App. at 137; the Government did not solicit 
applications for a federal monitor until February 2015, see id.; 
and the consent decree was not final until May 2016, see id. 
at 215.  By contrast, Roman was arrested in May 2014 and 
imprisoned until December of that year.  As such, it is 
plausible that Newark’s practices were ongoing when police 
officers searched and arrested him.  It is also reasonable to 
infer that the City’s corrective measures postdated the arrest.  
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focus.  The question is not whether some evidence can be 
viewed as supporting the City.  It is whether, viewing the 
pleadings and properly associated documents in the light most 
favorable to Roman, there are claims plausible enough to 
withstand a motion to dismiss.  We think there is one—the 
municipal liability claim.  And the Court did not have to look 
beyond the amended complaint and supporting documents to 
glean these facts.    
In sum, Roman’s municipal liability claim survives 
dismissal based on the record that was before the District 
Court.  Because the Court reached the opposite conclusion, 
we part with its holding.  Thus we vacate and remand this 
portion of its decision.  
B. The District Court correctly dismissed the 
false imprisonment and malicious 
prosecution claims because they were not 
pled under § 1983.  
Roman alleges the Defendants are also liable for false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution.  As noted, the 
District Court construed these claims as state-law claims.  It 
dismissed them because Roman did not comply with the New 
Jersey Tort Claims Act’s procedural requirements for 
bringing claims against public entities and public employees.  
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-1 et seq.  
On appeal, Roman contends the Court erred in 
dismissing his claims because they were pled under § 1983.  
The Defendants counter that both claims were presented as 
                                                                                                     
Hence we do not consider the City’s corrective measures to 
be enough to defeat Roman’s allegations. 
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state-law tort claims.  They also point out that Roman omitted 
them from his amended complaint.9  
As a preliminary matter, the Defendants correctly 
observe that false imprisonment and malicious prosecution 
are not in the amended complaint.  Hence we must first 
decide if Roman has waived his right to challenge their 
dismissal on appeal.  If we conclude that waiver does not 
apply, we then determine if the District Court correctly 
construed them as state-law tort claims.  
We have not applied a strict rule in favor of waiver in 
this context.  Instead, we have allowed “plaintiffs to appeal 
dismissals despite amended pleadings that omit the dismissed 
claim[,] provided repleading the particular cause of action 
would have been futile.”  United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. 
Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
in original) (footnote omitted).  “Repleading is futile when 
the dismissal was ‘on the merits.’  A dismissal is on the 
merits when it is with prejudice or based on some legal 
barrier other than want of specificity or particularity.”  Id.  If 
a court is uncertain, “doubt[] should be resolved against the 
party asserting waiver.”  Id. at 517 (emphasis in original).   
                                              
9 At oral argument, Roman’s counsel stated the false 
imprisonment claim was repled in Count 13 of the amended 
complaint even though that count alleges “conspiracy to 
commit unlawful imprisonment . . . [in violation of] 42 
U.S.C. § 1985.”  App. at 278 (emphasis added); see Audio 
Recording of Oral Argument held June 12, 2018 at 11:39 to 
12:06 (http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/17-
2302TheEstateofAdrianoRomanJrvCityofNewarketal.mp3).  
We do not consider this contention, as it was raised for the 
first time at oral argument and thus is waived.  See In re 
Grand Jury, 635 F.3d 101, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011).   
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Here the District Court analyzed both claims on legal 
grounds.  It observed that they were based on the New Jersey 
Tort Claims Act, which allows individuals to bring tort claims 
against public entities and employees after complying with 
certain procedural and notice requirements, see Tripo v. 
Robert Wood Johnson Med. Ctr., 845 F. Supp. 2d 621, 626-
27 (D.N.J. 2012) (summarizing the Act’s procedures for suing 
a public entity or employee).  It concluded Roman did not 
follow these requirements and thus dismissed the claims.   
  Although the Court was guided by procedural 
concerns, its dismissal was on the merits.  The Tort Claims 
Act bars claims against public entities and employees if a 
plaintiff waits more than two years to file a “notice of claim.”  
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-8(b).  The two-year mark is 
measured from the day the claim accrues (i.e., the day on 
which the public entity or employee allegedly harmed the 
plaintiff).  In our case, because Roman’s claims accrued in 
May 2014, he had until May 2016 to file a notice of claim.  
As the Court noted, however, he did not file any type of 
notice during the two-year period.  See Roman, 2017 WL 
436251, at *6 (observing that, as of January 31, 2017, the date 
on which the Court dismissed the complaint, Roman had not 
filed a notice).  Thus Roman’s procedural error morphed into 
a dismissal on the merits, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-8(b) 
(“The claimant shall be forever barred from recovering 
against a public entity or public employee if . . . [t]wo years 
have elapsed since the accrual of the claim.”), and he may 
appeal the District Court’s decision on his false imprisonment 
and malicious prosecution claims, see Atkinson, 473 F.3d at 
516-17.   
In light of this conclusion, we must focus on the 
pleadings and decide if Roman’s claims are based on § 1983.  
If we look to the complaint, it suggests both false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution are state-law tort 
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claims.  It never identifies them as § 1983 or federal claims.  
Rather, it presents them generically, following a series of 
other state-law tort claims.  See, e.g., App. at 44 (“intentional 
infliction of emotional distress”); id. at 46 (“negligent 
infliction of emotional distress”); id. at 47 (“assault and 
battery”); id. at 49 (“unlawful imprisonment”); id. at 51 
(“malicious prosecution”).  This indicates to us that Roman 
pled both claims as state-law claims, not federal claims.  
While the unlawful (i.e., false) imprisonment claim does note 
that the Defendants “restrict[ed] [Roman’s] constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of liberty and freedom of movement,” it is 
silent as to whether it refers to the United States or New 
Jersey Constitution.  Compl. ¶ 114.  This is too facile to 
imply the former when but a few identifying words would do.  
The default is New Jersey law, which defines false 
imprisonment as “an[y] unlawful restraint that interferes with 
a victim’s liberty” and requires “[n]o further wrongful 
purpose” for a prima facie showing.  State v. Savage, 799 
A.2d 477, 494 (N.J. 2009). 
Accordingly, the District Court correctly construed the 
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims as state-
law tort claims, and we affirm this portion of its holding.10   
C. The doctrines of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel, and judicial estoppel do not require 
us to dismiss Roman’s § 1983 claims. 
 Finally, the Defendants invoke the doctrines of res 
judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel.  According 
                                              
10 We also affirm the dismissal of Roman’s unlawful-
search claims because they were not adequately pled.  We do 
not opine on whether a plaintiff may allege joint and several 
liability in connection with an unlawful-search claim.   
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to them, each doctrine compels us to dismiss Roman’s § 1983 
claims.  
 We start with res judicata.  The Defendants contend it 
bars Roman’s claims because “the criminal matter and the 
suppression hearing were based on the exact same facts” as 
those alleged in Roman’s pleadings.  Defendants’ Br. at 64.  
In their view, criminal proceedings are enough to preclude a 
civil suit seeking damages under § 1983. 
 We disagree.  “A party seeking to invoke res judicata 
must establish three elements: (1) a final judgment on the 
merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their 
privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of 
action.”  Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Roman’s suit is not 
based on the same cause of action as the criminal complaint 
and suppression hearing.  Nor are his current claims of the 
type “that could have been brought” in the earlier criminal 
proceeding.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) (“The 
difference in degree of the burden of proof in criminal and 
civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of res 
judicata.”).  New Jersey initiated the criminal case.  Roman 
was not at liberty to assert any claims except for defenses 
against the prosecution’s case-in-chief.  See Leather v. Eyck, 
180 F.3d 420, 425 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[B]ecause the nature of 
the prior state[-]court proceeding was such that [the 
Appellant] could not have sought damages for his alleged 
constitutional injuries (while defending himself on [a 
criminal] charge . . . ), res judicata does not bar his federal § 
1983 suit for damages.”).  Moreover, he was not free to raise 
his § 1983 claims in the same criminal case; indeed, he could 
not bring them until the criminal proceeding concluded.  See 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994) (“[T]he . . . 
principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for 
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challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments 
applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the 
plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or 
confinement. . . .”).  Accordingly, res judicata does not bar 
Roman’s claims. 
 Moving on to collateral estoppel, the Defendants argue 
it (1) absolves Officer Mendes of liability because the 
Superior Court made a factual finding that Roman possessed 
the contraband that was seized from the apartment, (2) 
absolves Sergeant Joyce Hill because nothing in the Superior 
Court’s transcript indicates she was present for the search and 
arrest, and (3) absolves the other named defendants because 
the Superior Court’s transcript suggests they only handled the 
contraband.  According to the Defendants, the Superior Court 
decided all of these issues in their favor during the 
suppression hearing.  See Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Emps. of N. 
Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 505 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (stating a party is collaterally estopped from 
litigating a specific issue if, among other things, “[an] 
identical issue was decided in a prior adjudication”).  Again 
we disagree.  Contrary to the Defendants’ assertions, the 
Superior Court never decided any of these issues during the 
suppression hearing.  While it did find that Roman had a 
possessory interest in the apartment, that is not enough for us 
to conclude that he had actual or constructive possession over 
the contraband.  Collateral estoppel is not appropriate in this 
context.  
 Last, the Defendants assert that judicial estoppel 
precludes Roman’s claims because he admitted that (1) drugs 
were found in the apartment, (2) he had a possessory interest 
in the apartment, (3) Officer Mendes was the only officer who 
initiated the prosecution, and (4) the remaining officers only 
handled the contraband and had no other roles.  They insist 
these concessions “are sufficient to establish that [Roman’s] 
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arrest and prosecution arise out of his possession of 
incriminating evidence[.]”  Defendants’ Br. at 65.  As noted, 
“[j]udicial estoppel, sometimes called the ‘doctrine against 
the assertion of inconsistent positions,’ is a judge-made 
doctrine that . . . prevent[s] a litigant from asserting a position 
inconsistent with one that []he has previously asserted . . . in a 
previous proceeding.”  Ryan Operations G.P., 81 F.3d at 358.  
This doctrine is not in play here, as Roman never stipulated 
that Officer Mendes was the only officer to bring the 
prosecution or that the remaining officers only handled the 
contraband.  While the Court found that Roman had a 
possessory interest in the apartment, that interest (we repeat) 
is not enough to establish that he possessed the contraband.  
Accordingly, judicial estoppel does not require us to dismiss 
Roman’s claims. 
* * * * * 
 Roman has sufficiently alleged a municipal liability 
claim against the City of Newark under § 1983.  He cites 
various examples of inadequate police training, poor police 
discipline, and unheeded citizen complaints.  He tells us 
certain police officers did not receive training for over 20 
years, and their training did not cover the basic requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment.  In his pleadings, he states the 
Newark Police Department did not discipline officers who 
engaged in police misconduct, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84-86, 
including unlawful searches and false arrests, App. at 134.  
He also notes the public filed formal complaints about 
improper searches and false arrests that were disregarded 
almost wholesale.  Id.  These alleged practices were ongoing 
when Roman’s search and arrest occurred, and the City had 
notice of them at that time.  While the proof developed to 
support these allegations may or may not be persuasive to a 
finder of fact, they are enough to survive dismissal at this 
stage.  Based on this conclusion, we part with the District 
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Court’s holding that Roman failed to state a § 1983 claim 
against the City.  Though we affirm otherwise, we vacate and 
remand its decision on municipal liability.  
1 
 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I join the majority opinion and write separately only to 
note that, even if we were to ignore the suppression hearing 
transcript and the press release and the Star Ledger article, 
there is still a sound basis to conclude that Roman has stated 
plausible claims for municipal liability.  Our panel is united in 
understanding that we can properly consider the consent decree 
because it was provided to the District Court and was 
referenced and relied upon in Roman’s amended complaint.  
Those two sources – the consent decree and the amended 
complaint – are sufficient to overcome the motion to dismiss 
the claims against the City of Newark. 
 
The consent decree supports the allegations in the 
amended complaint in a number of respects.  For example, it 
expressly prohibits Newark Police officers “from relying on 
information known to be materially false or incorrect to justify 
a warrantless search or to seek a search warrant[.]”  (App. at 
158).  A fair inference from that prohibition is that it was 
needed precisely because the police were often relying on false 
information to justify warrantless searches.  That inference 
bolsters Roman’s allegation that “[n]o drugs were found in 
[his] possession” and yet the police “arrested [him] and falsely 
charged him with possession of a controlled dangerous 
substance[.]”  (App. at 263 ¶¶ 28-29).   
 
In another instance, the consent decree suggests that 
there has been a lack of training and supervision in the Newark 
Police Department.  To remedy that deficiency, the consent 
decree requires the Department to “provide all officers with at 
least 16 hours of training on stops, searches, arrests, ... [and] 
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training ... in ... Fourth Amendment issues” as well as 
mandating “desk lieutenant[s] or unit commander[s] [to] 
review each arrest report by officers under their command[.]”  
(App. at 159-61).  The inference that there was inadequate 
training supports Roman’s allegation that the Department’s 
officers, “through their actions, inactions, course of conduct, 
poor or non-existent training and deficient supervision[,] 
caused ... [the] illegal deprivation of [his] liberty[.]”  (App. at 
265 ¶ 48). 
 
As a final example, the consent decree says that the 
Department must “conduct integrity audits and compliance 
reviews to identify and investigate all officers who have 
engaged in misconduct including unlawful ... searches[] and 
seizures[.]”  (App. at 192).  The need for such audits and 
reviews lends plausibility to Roman’s allegation that the “City 
had a custom and practice of inadequately investigating ... 
citizens’ complaints regarding illegal search and seizure[.]”  
(App. at 272 ¶ 84). 
 
Thus, looking only at the amended complaint together 
with the consent decree, and giving Roman the benefit of all 
favorable inferences, as we must at this stage, there is a 
sufficient basis to say that Roman has stated plausible claims 
for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Dismissal of 
those claims was therefore an error.  
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
The District Court dismissed Roman’s case after giving 
him two opportunities to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted and after reconsidering its order of dismissal. Based 
on the record presented to it, the District Court’s decision was 
correct and should be affirmed as to all but one of Roman’s 
claims (the municipal liability claim for failure to train, 
supervise, or discipline). 
The Majority vacates part of the District Court’s 
judgment by reciting facts found nowhere in Roman’s 
amended complaint and by adding facts of its own creation that 
were neither pleaded nor argued to the District Court with 
sufficient specificity. The Majority’s deviation from standard 
civil practice and procedure compels this partial dissent. 
I 
This dissent results principally from a disagreement 
with my colleagues about which facts were properly before the 
District Court. First, the Majority proffers a narrative that 
Roman never gave the District Court and which has no 
relevance to the claims it revives. This Court need not (and 
should not) recite these “facts” and “background” as true. 
Second, Roman did not sufficiently plead a municipal liability 
claim based on Newark’s alleged pattern or practice of Fourth 
Amendment violations. If the facts as pleaded (or subject to 
judicial notice) were as the Majority recites them, I would 
agree that Roman stated a claim for relief. But since the actual 
facts before the District Court were quite different from those 
enunciated by the Majority, the District Court did not err by 
dismissing this claim. 
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Despite these disagreements with my colleagues, I 
agree with them that Roman’s amended complaint sufficiently 
stated a municipal liability claim for failure to train, supervise, 
or discipline. Yet I cannot agree with their reasoning in toto 
because we should not extrapolate—and the District Court did 
not err by declining to extrapolate—from extraneous 
documents (like the consent decree Roman never provided nor 
cited to the District Court) to reach that conclusion. This single 
claim should be resuscitated, but only based on the face of the 
amended complaint. 
A 
The Majority purports to recount the facts of this case 
“as set out in the amended complaint and the transcript of the 
[state court] suppression hearing.” Maj. Op. 4 n.1. Yet precious 
few of those facts were actually pleaded, primarily because the 
state court transcript was not proffered to the District Court by 
Roman. Moreover, the Majority’s narrative of Roman’s 
alleged mistreatment has effectively no bearing on the 
municipal liability claims it revives. 
The lion’s share of the troubling facts recited by the 
Majority were taken from sources other than Roman’s 
amended complaint. Those sources—including the state-court 
proceedings and subsequent briefs—paint a picture the District 
Court never observed while considering the motion to dismiss. 
In truth, the amended complaint says nothing about how the 
investigation began, or the surveillance of Roman’s apartment, 
or the initial interaction between police and Melissa Isaksem, 
or the officers’ use of Isaksem as a decoy to gain entry into the 
apartment, or the fact that drugs were seized from a common 
area, or the expletives and threats that specific officers yelled 
at both Roman and his father, or Officer Mendes’s use of 
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physical force. Unlike those graphic and specific facts the 
Majority extracts, the amended complaint is replete with 
conclusory and generalized assertions. See App. 261–63. 
Here are some examples of the Majority’s approach: 
Instead of averring that Officer Mendes flipped Roman on his 
stomach and put a knee in Roman’s neck, Maj. Op. 5, the 
amended complaint merely states that “[t]he Defendant 
Officers and Defendant John Does 1–20 (fictitious names) 
illegally assaulted the Plaintiff, throwing him against a wall 
and handcuffing him,” App. 262. And rather than recounting a 
detailed plan to initiate an illegal search that included using an 
unwitting friend as a decoy, Maj. Op. 5, the amended 
complaint states only that “‘Defendant Officers’ . . . and 
Defendant John Does 1–20 (fictitious names), after having the 
opportunity to observe that the Plaintiff was a person of Latino 
descent, initiated an illegal search and seizure of the Plaintiff’s 
residence,” App. 261. 
Now on appeal, for the first time Roman cites facts 
establishing how the police gained entry into the apartment, the 
threatening words they spoke, and the actions of Officer 
Mendes. Roman Br. 10–12. We should not endorse this 
unpleaded narrative, nor suggest the District Court erred by 
failing to manufacture it in the first place. 
B 
The Majority concludes that Roman’s amended 
complaint (supplemented by the consent decree, a news article, 
and a press release) contains enough facts to make plausible 
his claims that his injuries were proximately caused by 
Newark’s: (1) pattern or practice of constitutional violations in 
the area of arrest practices; and (2) failure to adequately train, 
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supervise, or discipline its officers. Maj. Op. 15–16. The first 
conclusion is unwarranted. And while the second conclusion is 
correct, the Majority still errs in its reliance on a document 
Roman never cited and inferential leaps that Roman’s 
pleadings themselves do not admit. 
1 
On its face, the amended complaint contains very few 
facts related to Roman’s arrest or Newark’s alleged pattern or 
practice of rights violations, and what it does contain amount 
only to conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (noting that a court’s duty to “accept as true 
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable 
to legal conclusions,” and that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice”). When we excise from the 
Majority’s narrative all facts that were neither pleaded nor 
presented to the District Court and the complaints’ legal 
conclusions, it becomes clear that the District Court did not err 
by twice deeming Roman’s complaint deficient regarding a 
pattern or practice of rights violations. 
This Court should not fault the trial judge for failing to 
take cognizance of facts or arguments never presented to her, 
especially here, where Roman chose not to include in his 
amended pleading facts that could have been gleaned from 
Defendants’ first motion to dismiss and the consent decree 
attached to it. See Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 
271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that “[a]n amended complaint 
supercedes the original version in providing the blueprint for 
the future course of a lawsuit”). 
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The Majority primarily (and incorrectly) relies on that 
consent decree to buttress Roman’s pattern-or-practice claim. 
Although the District Court could take notice of the consent 
decree’s existence, it’s quite another matter to hold it 
accountable for not accepting as true everything its contents 
could possibly imply—especially when Roman neither 
pleaded nor relied upon the decree’s contents. 
What is crucial is whether Roman’s complaint was 
“based” on the consent decree.1 In re Burlington Coat Factory 
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). Only to the 
extent the Majority refashions Roman’s pattern-or-practice 
claim such that it is now based on implausible inferences from 
the consent decree is it “based on” the consent decree. For 
Roman did not explicitly reference, quote, or rely on the 
document in his amended complaint—even after the City 
provided it. The amended complaint merely references the 
decree’s announcement by the Department of Justice months 
after his arrest.2 See App. 270 ¶ 68. The District Court, though 
it must draw all reasonable inferences in Roman’s favor, had 
no obligation to abstract facts or inferences or claims Roman 
                                              
1 His appellate briefs’ references to the document are 
not determinative, no matter how many times they cite the 
decree. 
2 This timing further complicates the Majority’s reliance 
on the consent decree. The decree’s announcement months 
after Roman’s arrest requires yet another “infer[ence] that the 
problems that led to it were occurring during the time of his 
allegations and for some time before that.” Maj. Op. 15. It also 
requires an inference that all of the City’s “corrective measures 
postdated the arrest.” Id. at 21 n.8. 
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chose not to plead.3 Instead, he was the master of his own 
complaint. See Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 773 
F.3d 495, 505 (3d Cir. 2014). 
And even if we accept as true all the consent decree 
contains, Roman’s arrest was not plausibly part of the pattern 
or practice of rights violations the decree addressed, except 
perhaps at the highest level of generality.4 For starters, the 
decree addressed police stops and arrests of pedestrians or the 
occupants of vehicles. See App. 79 (detailing the pattern or 
practice investigated by the DOJ that led to the consent 
                                              
3 The document’s undisputed authenticity as a 
government document says nothing about the reasonableness 
of the inferences the Majority abstracts from the consent 
decree. Nor does it speak to the contents’ relevance to Roman’s 
case. Such authenticity merely provides one reason for 
judicially noticing the decree’s existence and eliminates one 
potential reason for not relying on it. It does not follow that it 
is “especially important” for district courts to rely on and 
extrapolate from such documents. Maj. Op. 11. 
4 The consent decree itself admits no specific pattern or 
practice of rights violations. Although it followed a DOJ report 
that “revealed a pattern or practice of constitutional violations 
in areas including stop and arrest practices, use of force, and 
theft by officers,” that report was never provided to the District 
Court. App. 137; see Maj. Op. 11–12. Instead, the consent 
decree only outlines measures Newark agreed to take—not any 
pattern or practice of rights violations, let alone one that 
plausibly caused Roman’s injuries. In fact, that report actually 
demonstrates that even the pattern or practice that led to the 
consent decree could not plausibly have caused Roman’s 
injuries. 
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decree’s adoption). The consent decree says nothing about 
arrests or searches without consent that occur at residences, 
which is what Roman complains of in this case. 
Another problem that distinguishes Roman’s complaint 
from the problems that led to the consent decree is the fact that 
the decree addressed police practices that disparately impacted 
the black community. See App. 93–98 (detailing same).5 But 
that racial disparity did not apply to Roman, who was Hispanic. 
See App. 261 ¶ 16. While the consent decree may have been 
“meant to protect all Newark residents,” Maj. Op. 19, the point 
remains that the pattern or practice giving rise to it was not one 
that plausibly caused Roman’s injuries. 
Finally, the consent decree addressed erroneous 
narcotics arrest reports where “individuals often were 
purportedly seated in cars holding clear plastic baggies in front 
of them or on their laps and officers could ‘immediately’ see 
the contraband, even though the report indicated that the 
subject’s back was to an officer, or that the officer had not yet 
approached the car.” App. 92 (detailing the pattern or practice 
investigated by the DOJ that led to the consent decree’s 
adoption). Wholly unrelated to those erroneous reports, Roman 
alleges that officers exhaustively searched the apartment 
                                              
5 In his motion for reconsideration, Roman claimed his 
municipal liability argument was based on “the City’s 
widespread and systemic misuse of police powers to treat 
members of a protected racial class different from those of 
white citizens.” ECF 43-3 at 8. Unlike the pattern or practice 
of Fourth Amendment violations the Majority now remands, 
he argued “racial profiling, racial discrimination, or other 
widespread discrimination of minorities” gave rise to his 
municipal liability cause of action. Id. 
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without a warrant, and he is silent as to where and when the 
officers found the drugs. See App. 30–31, 262–63. 
In sum, Roman’s arrest was too dissimilar from the 
pattern or practice addressed by the consent decree to plausibly 
allege proximate causation for his injuries. While clear that the 
DOJ did not enter into the consent decree “because it was 
impressed with Newark’s policing practices,” Maj. Op. 20, it 
was not the District Court’s duty to imagine all possible 
inferences from the document. It was Roman’s duty to plead 
them. See Judon, 773 F.3d at 505. For the Majority to conclude 
otherwise, it must derive that pattern or practice from sources 
not before the District Court and define it at the highest level 
of generality: Fourth Amendment violations writ large. In other 
words, my colleagues conclude that because Newark police 
allegedly engaged in a pattern or practice of Fourth 
Amendment violations of type x, it follows that they plausibly 
committed this violation of type y—all based on a document 
they cannot claim the District Court must have considered. The 
District Court did not err in failing to perform the Majority’s 
inferential leaps to reach that conclusion based on a document 
it need not have considered in the first place. It properly 
dismissed this claim rather than indulge such speculation. See 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679–80. 
With or without these sources, the amended complaint’s 
bare legal conclusions need not be accepted as true. Id. at 678. 
So Roman failed to state a pattern-or-practice claim on which 
relief could be granted. 
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2 
Roman’s failure-to-train, failure-to-supervise, and 
failure-to-discipline claim was sufficiently pleaded. But the 
Majority’s method for arriving at this conclusion suffers from 
similar deficiencies to its pattern-or-practice reasoning. The 
Majority’s reliance on the consent decree is again misplaced 
for the reasons discussed above.6 And even if such reliance 
were appropriate, the consent decree does not make Roman’s 
claim plausible. 
Roman’s arrest was not plausibly caused by the failures 
to train, supervise, or discipline Newark officers the Majority 
cites in the consent decree because no such failures appear in 
the document. The Majority claims “the consent decree 
indicates Newark police officers were not trained on ‘the 
requirements of [the] Fourth Amendment and related law.’” 
Maj. Op. 16. And “per the decree” the City’s “training did not 
cover the basics of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 17. It does 
no such thing. Rather, it indicates that Newark agreed to 
                                              
6 The Majority’s reliance on the news article and press 
release hyperlinked in Roman’s complaints is likewise 
inappropriate. The news article’s identification of one 
officer—who may or may not have been involved in Roman’s 
arrest—who told a reporter he “think[s]” he did not receive 
training for 20 years is not enough to subject the City to 
liability for failure to adequately train its entire police force. 
App. 134 (emphasis added). This demonstrates no custom; nor 
does it plausibly demonstrate the police academy training all 
officers receive was constitutionally inadequate without more 
follow-up. Nor does the article address supervision or 
discipline. Similarly, the press release addresses none of the 
three.  
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implement additional training on “the requirements of [the] 
Fourth Amendment and related law” without any detail as to 
the status quo it addressed. App. 160. While it’s safe to say that 
the DOJ did not endorse that status quo, the difference between 
agreeing to train more and agreeing that prior training was 
constitutionally inadequate regarding the Fourth Amendment 
writ large should be clear. And, as discussed above, the consent 
decree arose from a host of policing practices unlike those 
Roman alleged (except at the highest level of generality). 
Newark could not plausibly have agreed to the extraordinary 
liability that would come from admitting that its police training 
violated the Fourth Amendment in every instance, or in every 
instance possibly connected to Roman’s arrest. Indeed, the 
decree says no such thing about any instance. 
The consent decree is even thinner as it relates to 
supervisory and disciplinary issues. From the City’s agreement 
to adhere to certain review processes and disciplinary measures 
regarding unlawful searches and false arrests, the Majority 
perceives a “deliberate indifference to Roman’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.” Maj. Op. 17 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). That does not follow. The decree does not 
describe or admit any processes or measures already in place 
or any existing pattern of unlawful searches or false arrests. 
Instead, Roman’s amended complaint directly alleged 
training, supervision, and discipline problems with adequate 
specificity to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., App. 270–
72 ¶¶ 68, 70, 71, 78, 80, 82; see also Doe v. Luzerne Cty., 660 
F.3d 169, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Carter v. City of 
Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir.1999)) (detailing standard at 
summary judgment for failure-to-train claim). The Majority’s 
improper reliance on the consent decree and inferential leaps 
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from that and other sources outside the amended complaint are, 
in my view, erroneous and unnecessary. 
* * * 
As we have noted many times before, we are a court of 
review, not a court of first view. See, e.g., In Re: J & S Props., 
LLC, 872 F.3d 138, 148 (3d Cir. 2017). Our review is based on 
the record as presented by counsel in our adversary system. We 
should not fault the District Court for failing to manufacture 
facts and craft arguments that Roman neglected to plead. By 
conjuring its own facts repackaged as if pleaded in the 
amended complaint, the Majority imposes a new duty upon 
district judges within the Third Circuit. It does so without 
citing precedent for the proposition that a district court must 
consider facts and arguments never pleaded or argued by the 
plaintiff. I cannot subscribe to this new rule. 
This appeal implicates a fundamental legal principle: 
the plaintiff is the master of his complaint. Because of that 
time-honored principle, Roman’s failure to state a policy-or-
practice claim upon which relief may be granted requires the 
harsh sanction of dismissal. After his initial complaint was 
found inadequate, Roman failed to file an amended complaint 
that cured the deficiencies identified by the District Court. 
Even assuming Roman might have had a legitimate claim, it 
would have been improper for the District Court to try to make 
Roman’s case for him. And it’s especially inappropriate for us 
to overrule the decision of a district judge because of a failure 
to apprehend facts and arguments never presented to her. I 
respectfully dissent. 
